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ably be required to -pay the repair bill in order to minimize 
the damages. 
It also appears from a finding of the trial court, which is 
amply supported by the evidence, that plaintiff attempted 
and was unable to obtain the use of a substitute truck while 
his truck was being repaired. [9] Certainly he was' not 
required to yield to defendant company's demand that he 
release it from all liability in order to minimize the damages 
resulting from its tortious act. Thus, it cannot be said that 
plaintiff did not act with the care and diligence. to be ex-
pected of the ordinarily prudent man under similar cir-
cumstances. 
[10] Defendants finally contend that the trial court erred 
in permitting plaintiff to amend his complaint after the case 
was submitted, and in refusing to set aside the submission in 
order to permit them to plead to the amended complaint and 
offer further evidence on the issues tendered thereby. They 
argue that the amendment changed the cause of action from 
one of tort to one of breach of contract, that the alleged con-
tract to repair the truck set forth in the amendment was en-
tered into without authority of defendant company, and that 
the cause of action based upon breach of contract was barred 
by the statp.te of limitations. The original complaint which 
set forth a cause of action based upon defendants' negligence 
alleged that defendant company agreed to repair the truck 
at its expense. In their answers, defendants denied that they 
were negligent or that defendant company agreed to repair 
the truck. The amendment to the complaint realleged de-
fendants' negligence and, in conformity with the proof, set 
forth with greater particularity the company's agreement to 
repair the truck. The amendment did not change the cause 
of action, and it was authorized by section 470 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. (Andrus v. Smith, 133 Cal. 78, 81 [65 
P. 320] ; Burrows v. Burrows, 18 Cal.App.2d 275, 278 [63 P. 
2d 1135].) The trial court therefore did not err in permitting 
plaintiff to amend his complaint to conform to the proof. 
[11] Nor did it err in refusing to set aside submission of 
the case to allow defendants to plead to the amended com-
plaint and offer additional evidence. When an amendment 
~o a complaint is properly filed to conform to proof, the 
l~SUes tendered thereby are deemed denied without pleading 
SlDce they already have been tried. (Glougie v. Glot£gie, 174 
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Cal. 126, 132 [162 P. 118]; McDougald v. Argonaut Land 
etc. 00., 1170a1. 87, 95 [48 P.1021].) The issues presented 
by the amendcd complaint were raised by the pleadings prior 
to the amendment, and defendants had ample opportunity 
to, and did, offer evidence thereon during the course of the 
trial. ' 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer; J., 
and Spence, J., pro tem., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 18365. In Bank. Mal'. 29, 1944.] 
KATE H. HANNAH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J. W.C. 
POGUE et al., Appellants; THE REGENTS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), 
Cross-Defendant and Respondent. 
KATE H. HANNAH, Respondent, v. J. W. C. POGUE et al., 
Appellants. (Two Cases.) 
[1] Advorse Possession-Prescriptive Title to Easement--User.-
The scope of a prescriptive easement is determined by the use 
through which it is acquired. A person using the land of an-
other for the prescriptive period may acquire the right to con-
tinue such use, but does not acquire the right to make other 
uses of it. 
[2] Easements-Mode and Extent of User-Loeation.-If an ease-
ment is acquired by grant in a given location in the servient 
tenement, it becomes fixed by use and its location may not be 
substantially changed. 
[3a,3b] Waters-Easements in Regard to Use of Water-Changes. 
-A person having the right to maintain a dam and ditch on 
the hmd of another has no right to change their locations by 
[1] See 1 Cal.Jur. 597; 17 Am.Jur. 993. 
[3] See 26 Cal.Jut. 165. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Adverse Possession, § 125; [2,4] 
EalJemcnts, §30; [3] Waters, §249; [5J Waters, §217; [6,7] 
Boundaries, § 55(5); [8J Boundaries, § 59; [9] Injunctions, § 14; 
(10J Easements, § 53; [11] Witnesses, § 297(4); . 
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the construction of a new dam and a connecting channel on 
other portions of the land, although the new dam may consti-
tute no greater burden than the previous one, hnd although 
the extension to the original ditch is placed in the channel of 
a river. 
[4] Easements-Mode and Extent of User-Location-Changes.-
There is no right to change the location of an easement over 
the land of another, even if it would cause no harm to the 
owner or would actually benefit him. 
[5] Waters-User of Water Rights-Dams-Trial and Relief.-
In an action to enjoin the maintenance of a dam across a river 
running through plaintiff's property, a decree preventing de-
fendants from constructing a dam except at a specified site 
should be construed to allow them to do whatever is necessary 
to such construction, including the right to tie the aam into 
the shore. And where the judgment establishes defendants' 
right to extend the dam so far as is necessary to meet one 
shore of the river, the judgment should not be construed as 
denying a comparable right if the opposite shore receded. 
[6] Boundaries - Establishment - Evidence -Sufficiency-Agree-
ment.-An agreement establishing a boundary line when the 
true line is uncertain or disputed, may be inferred from the 
long-standing acceptance of a fence as a boundary between 
the lands of two owners. 
[7] Id.-Establishment-Evidence-Sufficiency-Agreement.-The 
testimony of one of two adjoining land owners that a fence 
was in existence when her husband acquired the property 
many years previously, and that she believed the fence marked 
the boundary unt~l she le.arned that the other owner had em-
ployed a surveyor to determine the boundary, established her 
acceptance of the fence as the boundary; and her further tes-
timony that she knew of no agreement that the fence should 
constitute the boundary did not necessarily rebut the inference 
that there was such an agreement, where such inference could 
be made from the long-standing acceptance of the fence as the 
boundary. 
[8] Id.-Establishment-Judgment-Location of Boundary Line.-
Where the monument described in a judgment as markin(t 
a boundary was a stake and iron pin which a deputy county 
surveyor testified he removed before judgment, the judgment 
was reversed with directions to re-establish the stake and 
pin so that the boundary line might be made certain. 
[9] Injuncti~~s-:-Matters Controllable-Acts Completed.-A judg-
ment enJOInIng defendants from taking dirt or branches from 
[9J See 14 Cal.Jar. 209. 
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plaintiff's land violates the rule that an injunction is .ordered 
against past acts only if there is evidence that they w~ll prob-
ably recur, where there is evidence that on tw~ occaSIOns one 
defendant took dirt and branches, but no eVldence .that he 
intends to continue doing so. 
[10] Easements _ Remedies_Injunction-Dec.lar.at,ory Relief.-A 
defendant having a right of way over plamttf'f s property was 
improperly enjoined from entering said l.and wher~ t~e;e was 
no evidence that he had . ever entered Without plalI1td'f s con-
sent or that he intended to do so. In the absence of such evid~nce a claim of right to enter at points other than those 
that the' court designated in locating his easement. s~ould. be 
determined by declaratory relief rather than by InJunction. 
[11] Witnesses-Determination of Credibility-Right to l?isregard 
Uncontradicted Testimony.-Where there was no e~Idence of 
damaO'e resulting from plaintiff's wrongful obstruction of de-fenda~t's easement on plaintiff's land other than de~endant's 
. testimony that he was convinced that the cost o~ hIS ope~a­
tions on the land had been increased about one-thIrd, t~e t1'l~1 
court was justified in regarding this testimony as unrelIable 1ll 
view of the interest of the witness. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Tula:e 
County. Andrew R. Schottky, Judge assigned. Affirmed m 
part and reversed in part with directions. 
Actions to quiet title and for injunctive relief.J~dgm;en~ 
for plaintiff affirmed in part and reversed in part WIth direc-
tions. 
McFadzean & Crowe for Appellants. 
Conley, Conley & Conley, W. M. ~onley, Phi1ipC0111~i, 
Mathew Conley and Calkins, Hall, Lmforth .& Coriard .fo,r 
Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Mrs. Kate H. Hannah is the 
owner of approximately a section of land in Tulare County 
subject to a $50,000 mortgage hel? by the Regents of. the 
University of California .. Through It runs the Kaweah RIve:, 
from which defendant Harley Smith has for many years dI-
verted water by means of a dam located on plaintiff's land 
and a ditch known as the Hamilton Di~ch, wh~ch also runs 
through plaintiff's property. The Hamilton DItch has been 
I! 
852 HANNAH V. POGUE [23 C.2d 
in use since about 1860, and the, trial court found that the 
da~ has becn in use for ovex: twcnty years. The dam in 
eXIstence before 1920 was built of rock, but in that year it 
was replaced by ~ cement dam on the same site. By 1925 the 
latter had sunk mto the sand of the river bed and was re-
placed by another cement dam on the same site. In 1928 and 
1929 de~endant J. W. C. Pogue purchased the land served 
by t~e dItch and entcred into a contract to purchase the ditch 
and Its appurtenances. 
In 1936 the river washed round the north end of the dam. 
Defendant Pogue then entered plaintiff's land and repaired 
the. da.m with dirt a~d branches from the surrounding area. 
PlaI.n~Iff brought SUIt and obtained it temporary order re-
strammg defendant from entering plaintiff's property. After 
defendant agr~e~ to ~ake no more materials from plaintiff's 
p~operty, the mJunctIOn was modified by stipulation to per-
mIt defendant to enter and repair the dam. Defendant there-
aft~r !lIed a c~o~s-complaint in this proceeding, asking that 
plamtIff be enJomed from interfering with certain rights of 
wa~ to the dam over plaintiff's land. The University of 
Cal:fornia was joined as cross-defendant to this cross-com-
plamt. 
Early in 1937 the Kaweah River again washed round the 
north end. ?f the dam, doubling the width of the channel 
~nd deposltm~ a lar?"e sand bar in front of the ditch. Early 
m 1938 the rIver WIdened the channel still more. Through 
1937 defend~nt Pogue made no attempt to extend the dam 
t? the OpposIte bank of the river, but obtained water by cut-
tmg ~he ditch through the sand bar to the river and by 
pumpmg water into the ditch. In 1938 he constructed a new 
dam of rock some distance upstream from the old cement 
dam. The old dam was placed squarely across the river its 
wall ?erpend~cular to the banks, so that it forced water into 
t~e dltC? by Impounding it at a level higher than the bottom 
of the dItch.. The new rock dam was placed at an acute angle 
a:ross the rIver, so that the end that touched the bank oppo-
sIte the mouth of the ditch was farther upstream than the end 
~earest th~ mouth. The current of the river was thus directed 
mto the dItch, which had been extended upstream to the site 
of the new dam. The downstream end of the new dam was 
about 185 feet upstream from the south end of the old cement 
dam; the upstream end was about 950 feet above the point 
Mar. 1944] HANNAH v. POGUE 
[23 C.2d 8491 
853 
where the old dam would have touched the bank of the river 
had it been extended that far. ' 
On June 19, 1D39, plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the main-
tenance of the new dam and the channel running thereto 
from the Hamilton Ditch. A quiet title suit was also pend-
ing between plaintiff and defendant to settle a controversy 
over the ownership of land arising out of the erosion caused 
by the river's washing round the northern end of the dam. 
The eroded land is near the boundary between section 7; 
largely owned by plaintiff, and section 8, at least the eastern 
part of which is being purchased by defendant Pogue. There 
is an old fence running from north to south in this neighbor-
hood of the disputed boundary. The monument that once 
marked the north corner of these sections no longer exists and 
surveyors differed in their testimony as to where it had prob-
ably been located. 
On August 21, 1939, plaintiff brought suit to quiet title 
to the disputed triangle of land along the boundary. On 
August 19, 1939, plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the main-
tenance of certain levees by defendant Pogue. These suits, 
together with the original action by plaintiff against defen-
dant Pogue to enjoin defendant from entering plaintiff's 
lands, and defendant's cross-complaint in that action, were 
joined for trial. They were tried by the court, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were made and judgment was 
entered. Defendants Pogue and Smith were enjoined from 
entering plaintiff's land except over designated rights of way; 
plaintiff was enjoined from interfering with those easements; 
defendants were required to remove t4e new dam and to fill 
in the ditch running from the dam to the former mouth of 
the Hamilton Ditch. Defendants were enjoined from main-
taining any dam, except on the site of the concrete dam as 
extended to the opposite shore, and from maintaining a ditch 
on plaintiff's land except along the line where the Hamilton 
Ditch had run, meeting the Kaweah River about 20 to 30 
feet above the concrete dam. In the quiet title action the 
court determined that the boundary followed the old fence, 
thus establishing that the erosion at the north end of the rock 
dam was on plaintiff's lana. While defendants object to the 
location at which the trial court placed a right of way for 
them to the dam on the north side of the river, the trial court 
granted a new trial as to this issue, so that it is not now 
. " 
! ! 
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before the court. As to the location of the other rights of 
way, there is no objection by either party. Defendants ap-
peal from the judgments set forth above. Plaintiff takes no 
appeal from these judgments or from the judgment denying 
her an injunction against the maintenance of the levees men-
tioned above. 
The principal dispute between plaintiff and defendants 
concerns the defendants' claim of a right to change the site 
of the dam and ditch. Defendants contend that the scope 
of their easement has been too narrowly determined, and 
that the construction of the new dam upstream and of a con-
necting channel was within the scope of their right to repair 
and improve their easement. It must be assumed that their 
easement is based on prescription, for the proof was not that 
the right was granted, but that these facilities had been main-
tained for the prescriptive period. [1] The scope of a pre-
scriptive easement is determined by the use through whieh 
it is acquired. A person using the land of another for the 
prescriptive period may acquire the right to continue such 
use, but does not acquire the right to make other uses of it. 
(Vestal v. Young, 147 Cal. 715 [82 P. 381]; North Fork 
Water 00. v. Edwards, 121 CaL 662 [54 P. 69]; Oliver v. 
Agasse, 132 Cal. 297 [64 P. 401] ; Allen v. San Jose Land & 
W. 00., 92 Cal. 138 [28 P. 215, 15 L.R.A. 93] ; Pacific Gas & 
E. 00. v. Orockett L. & O. 00., 70 Cal.App. 283 [233 P. 370] ; 
Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119 [180 P. 67]; see 
White Bros. & Orum 00. v. Watson, 64 Wash. 666 [117 P. 
497, 44 L.R.A.N.S. 254] ; 3 Tiffany, Real Property [3d ed.) 
334; 28 C.J.S. 763.) [2] Likewise if an easement is ac-
quired by grant in a given location in the servient tenement 
it becomes fixed by use and its location may not be substan: 
tially changed. (Kern Island Irrigating 00. v. Oity oj 
Bakersfield, 151 Cal. 403 [90 P. 1052] j F'elsenthal v. War-
ring, supraj Evangelical etc. Home v. Buffalo Hydraulic 
Assoc., 64 N.Y. 561, see Ward v. City of Monrovia, 16 Cal. 
2d 8~5 [108 P.2d 425].) .Thus, in Vestal v. Young, supra, 
and m F'elsenthal v. Warnng, supra, it was held that a per-
son having the right to maintain a ditch in the land of an-
other cannot substantially change the route of the ditch. (See, 
also, Kern Island Irrigating Oo.v. Bakersfield, supra.) In 
the Evangelical Home case, supra, it was held that a person 
having the right to maintain a dam cannot change its loea-
Mar. 1944] HANNAH V. POGUE 
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tion, and in White Bros. & Orum Oompany v. Watson, supra, 
it was held that a person with a right to divert water through 
a ditch in the land of another has no right to replace the 
ditch with a dam and a flume elsewhere on the land, even 
though changes in the natural conditions make effective di-
version impossible except by such means. 
[3a] Defendants have not shown that they or .thei~ prede-
cessors in interest ever maintained a dam and ditch m loca-
tions other than those occupied by the old concrete dam and 
the ditch. ,They have thus shown no rig?t by presc:r:ip~io~ 
or otherwise to make any use of the remamder of plamtIff s 
land and the trial court properly restricted them to the site 
previously occupied. Otherwise they would have had a float-
ing easement enabling them to maintain a dam wherever they 
chose along the length of the river on plaintiff's lan~,pre­
venting plaintiff from selling any of the land bordermg on 
the river free of the easement. Defendants contend that the 
new dam constitutes no greater burden than the previous one. 
[4] There is no right, however, to change the location of 
an easement over the land of another, even if it would cause 
no harm to the owner or would actually benefit him. (Vestal 
v. Young, supra, at 719; see Allen v. San Jose Land & W. 
00., supra, at 141.) 
[3b] Defendants contend that the extensio~ ~ the Ham~l­
ton Ditch is permissible on the ground that It 18 placed m 
the channel of the river. The evidence shows that it was 
excavated in dry land on plaintiff's property, and it is im-
material whether that land be regarded as the dry bed of the 
river or the dry bank, for under the principles set forth 
above defendants may not thus appropriate plaintiff's prop~ 
erty. Defendants rely on the early case of Ware v. ~alke,., 
70 Cal. 591 [12 P. 475]. In that case a, gravel bar mth~ , 
bed of an arroyo built up by freshets prevented the water 
therein from reaching the head of Ware's ditch. It was held 
that Ware had the right to remove obstructions to the flow 
of the stream and did not exceed his right when he cut a chan-
nel through the bar and constructed a w:ing dam to divert 
water into the channel. Defendants, however, are not seek~ 
ing to cut through the bar built in front, ot .the old head 
of their ditch, a right that has never been demed them" but 
to replace the dam they once maintained with a new dam 
working on different principles, at a different site, and to 
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connect that dam with thcir ditch by maintaining a 187 -foot 
channel on plaintiff's land bchind and paralleling the sand 
bar. Nothing in thc Ware case authorizes such alterations 
in established easemcnts. 
[5] It is contended that the decree preventing defendants 
from constructing a dam except at the former site makes it 
impossible for them to construct any dam, for they are au-
thorized only to build a dam to the shore but not to tie it 
into the shore. The jUdgment allowing them to build t1.e 
dam, however, should be construed to allow them to do what-
ever is necessary to such construction, including the right 
to tie the dam into the shore. It is also contended that since 
the judgment authorizes construction of a dam from the old 
site to the north shore, it does not authorize extensions in case 
the river works its way round the south shore of the dam. 
The language in question, however, appears to anticipate 
the possibility that a dam on the old site, no longcr than the 
old dam, would touch the south shore but not the north. This 
language establishes that defendants still have the right, fre-
quently exercised in the past, to extend the dam so far as is 
necessary to meet the north shore. It should not be construed 
as denying a comparable right if the south shore receded. 
[6] Defendants appeal also from the jUdgment that the 
boundary between plaintiff's land and defendants' land is 
the old fence. The trial court found that about the year 
1917 the owners of these lands agreed that the fence should 
be the boundary. Defendants contend that there is no evi-
dence of such an agreement, and that in any event it could 
not be given effect unless the boundary were uncertain, or 
disputed. It is the rule, however, that the court may infer 
that there was such an agreement ensuing from uncertainty 
or a dispute, from the long-standing acceptance of a fence 
as a boundary between the lands of two owners. (Roberts 
v. Brae, 5 Ca1.2d 356 [54 P.2d 698] ; Vowinckel v. N. Clark 
&- Sons, 217 Cal. 258 [18 P.2d 58] ; Moniz v. Peterman, 220 
Cal. 429 [31 P.2d 353] ; Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. 
App. 102 [201 P. 952] ; Todd v. Wallace, 25 Cal.App.2d 459 
[77 P.2d 877] ; Perich v. Ma.urer, 29 Cal.App. 293 [155 P. 
471] ; Swartzbaugh v. Sargent, 30 Cal.App.2d 467 [86 P.2d 
895] ; Southern Oounties Gas 00. v. Eden, 118 Cal.App. 582 
[5 P.2d 654] ; Raney v. Merritt, 73 Cal.App. 244, 250 [238 
P. 767] ; see Park v. Powers, 2 Ca1.2d 590, 599 [42 P.2d 75] ; 
Clapp v. Ohurchill, 164 Cal. 741, 746 [130 P. 1061]; see 14 
Cal.L.Rev. 138.) 
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[7] Mrs. Hannah testified that the fence was ~n exist~nce 
when her husband acquired the property, that It remamed 
standing down to the time of the trial, and that she believed 
it marked the boundary until she learned that defendant 
Pogue had employed a surveyor to determine the boundary. 
This testimony establishes her acceptance of the fence as 
the boundary, .in all likelihood reflecting t~e belief of her 
husband and former owners on the other SIde of the fence. 
She also testified that she knew of no agreement that the 
fence should constitute the boundary. This testimony does 
not necessarily rebut the inference that there was 'such an 
agreement, however, for the inference may be made that an 
agreement was inherent in the long-standing acceptance of 
the fence as the boundary. (Roberts v. Brae, supra, at 359; 
Vowinckel v. N. Clark &- Sons, supra, at 260; Moniz v. Peter-
son, supra, at 435; Board of Trustees v. Mfller, supra, at 105; 
Southern Oounties Gas 00. v. Eden, 118 Cal..App. 582, 586 
[5 P.2d 654] ; see 14 Cal.L.Rev. 138.) The courts have recog-
nized such boundaries because the early surveys in the state 
were most uncertain, and in later years the monuments and 
landmarks they described could not be found. (See Loeb, 
The Establishment of Boundary Lines by Practical Location, 
4 Cal.L.Rev. 179.) In the present case the boundary lines 
could not be ascertained from the early surveys, for the mon-
ument determining the northern end of the boundary and 
most of the other landmarks cannot be found. Given the 
difficulties of fixing the boundaries anew according to the 
. old surveys, the trial court properly recognized a line that 
has served for many years as the practical boundary. 
The trial court decided that this boundary was settled b, 
agreement in 1917, apparently because this year marked the 
acquisition of the property by the Hannahs and their ac-
ceptance of the fence as a boundary. It is unnecessary to 
decide whether on this evidence the agreement can be as-
signed to this particular date, for the precise date of agree-
ment is immaterial in view of the acceptance of the fence as 
a boundary over a long period of years. 
[8] Defendants contend that the description in the judg-
ment of the location of the fence lacks definiteness. Part of 
the section was surveyed by the federal government,' but part 
was swamp and overflowed land first surveyed by the 
county surveyor after the land was granted by the federal 
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government to the state. The federal survey defhled the 
eastern boundary from its southern end t6 the point where 
it met the swamp and overflowed area; the county survey 
defined the rest of the boundary. The boundary from that 
point northerly to the intersection of the fence with the 
northern line of the section was regarded as marked by the 
fence. The monument described as marking the point wherf! 
the fence met the edge of the swamp and overtlowed area was 
a 2" by 2" stake and iron pin which the deputy county sur-
veyor testified he removed before judgment. Since the judg-
ment ties the fence as the boundary line to the stake and pin 
as established before removal, it must be reversed with di-
rections to re-establish the stake and pin so that the boundary 
line may be made certain. 
[9] The third judgment from which defendants appeal 
fixes the locations of defendants' easements. Defendants were 
enjoined from entering plaintiff's property except by route 
of designated easements, and from taking dirt or branches 
from plaintiff's land. The latter part of the judgment vio-
lates the rule that an injunction is ordered against past acts 
only if there is evidence that they will probably recur. (Ball 
v. Kehl, 87 Cal. 505 [25 P. 679J; Blackmore Inv. (]o. v. 
Johnson, 213 Cal. 148 [1 P.2d 978] ; Thome v. Honcut Dredg-
ing Co., 43 Cal.App.2d 737 [111 P.2d 368) ; see 32 C.J. 46; 
cases collected 14 Cal.Jur. 209.) There was evidence that 
on two occasions defendant Pogue took dirt and branches. 
There was no evidence that he intended to continue doing so. 
[10] Defendant Smith was improperly enjoined from en-
tering plaintiff's land, for there was no evidence that he had 
ever entered without plaintiff's consent, or that he intended 
to do so. While he claimed the right on the pleadings to 
enter at points other than those that the court later desig-
nated in locating his easement, such a claim should be deter-
mined by declaratory relief rather than by injunction. This 
judgment is therefore reversed insofar as it enjoins defen-
dants from taking dirt and branches and enjoins defendant 
Smith from entering, with directions to declare that Smith 
has the right to enter only over the easements that it declares 
to be on the north and south sides of the river. In other re-
spects this judgment is affirmed. 
[11] Defendant Pogue contends that the trial court erred 
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in refusing him damages for the obstruction of his rights 
of way. The trial court found that plaintiff had wrongfully 
obstrueted his easement, to his loss, but was .unable to de~er­
mine the amount of damage. The only testImony regardmg 
that issue was that of defendant Pogue, limited to .the gen-
eral statement that he was convinced the cost of his opera-
tions had been increased about one-third. The total cost of 
repairing and maintaining the dam was about $8~500. I~ 
contending that Pogue's testimony should. be admItted, h~s 
attorney stated that this figure was an est1m~te, and that It 
was impossible to show the loss of any spec~fic amount on 
any specific occasion. There was no other eVlde~ce of. dam-
age, and the trial court was justified in regardmg th~s tes-
timony as unreliable in view of the interest of the wlt~ess. 
(Caldwell v. Weiner, 203 Cal. 543 [264 P. 1110]; DavM v. 
Judson, 159 Cal. 121, 128 [113 P. 147] ; Blanc v. Connor, 167 
Cal. 719, 723 [141 P. 217]; Lejeune v. General Petroleum 
Corp., 128 Cal.App. 404 [18 P.2d 429].) . 
The judgments are affirmed in part and reversed m part 
as set forth above, with costs to be borne by appellant. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., 
and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 27, 
1944. 
[L. A. No. 18685. In Bank. Mar. 29, 1944.] 
EDW ARD M. JONES, Respondent, v. INDEPENDENT 
TITLE COMPANY et al., Defendants; RAE L. SIN· 
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of real property without notice of a prior trust deed, recor~ed 
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[1] See 18 Cal.Jur. 112; 25 Oal.Jur. 822; '36 Am.Jur. 793. 
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